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Abstract 
 
There is a fundamental tension intrinsic in many sports: human sex is not binary, but there are 
only two categories in which people can compete: men, and women. Over the last ten years, 
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) regulations have been at the 
centre of two high profile legal disputes. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) reached two 
contradicting rulings: in the first case (Dutee Chand vs Athletics Federation India and IAAF) 
the IAAF Regulations for the Eligibility of Athletes to compete in the female category were 
suspended (July 24th, 2015) on grounds of “discrimination against the female category”; in the 
latter (Caster Semenya and Athletics South Africa vs IAAF) the regulations were reaffirmed 
(May 1st, 2019) on grounds that although discriminatory, they are necessary to maintain a “level 
playing field” and to “protect” the female category. Although Semenya’s case has paved the 
way for questioning existing gender norms in sport, a new stable norm has yet to emerge from 
her case. The pharmacological solution put forward by IAAF to the tension between fairness 
and inclusivity of bodies non-conforming to two sexes is not, however, the only possible 
solution/resolution to the case, as I aim to show in this paper, where I present some reflections 
on this topic and suggest how CAS should approach the case if it hopes to resolve it. 
 
 
Word-count: 4,643 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a fundamental tension intrinsic in track and field and many other sports: human 
sex is not binary, but there are only two categories in which people can compete: men, and 
women. In the late 1990s, sex testing had been abandoned by the International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as a consensus 
emerged that it was creating more issues than the ones they were trying to solve (supposedly 
to identify men masquerading as women to compete in the female category).1After a brief 
interval, sex testing re-emerged in 2009 with the case of South African runner Caster Semenya, 
whose gold medal at the World Track & Field Championship in Berlin was revoked on 
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suspicion of ‘being a man’.2 IAAF’s investigation concluded that Semenya was affected by a 
(undisclosed) “differences of sex differentiation” condition, which provided her with high 
testosterone levels and gave her an unfair advantage in competition over other female athletes. 
In May 2011, IAAF enacted new regulations restricting the eligibility of female athletes with 
hyperandrogenism to compete in the female category only under an androgen suppressive 
regime to bring down the levels of testosterone to below 10 nmol/L.3 
 
 Over the last ten years, the IAAF regulations have been at the centre of two high profile 
legal disputes. The supreme arbiter of legal disputes in sport, the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) based in Lausanne, Switzerland, reached two somewhat contradicting rulings: in the 
first case - Chand vs Athletics Federation India (AFI) and IAAF - the regulations were 
suspended (July 24th, 2015) on grounds of “discrimination against the female category”; in the 
latter - Semenya and Athletics South Africa vs IAAF - the regulations were reaffirmed (May 
1st, 2019) on grounds that although discriminatory, they are necessary to maintain a “level 
playing field” and to “protect” the female category. In this latest arbitration, CAS accepted “the 
logic of IAAF’s submission” and concluded that “restrictions on the eligibility to compete […] 
are necessary to maintain fair competition in female athletics”. 4 Semenya’s subsequent appeal 
to the Swiss Federal Tribunal has reversed the 2019 CAS Award5 with the result that the 
regulations remain suspended,6 although it is unclear whether they will remain so until the 
World Championship in Doha in September 2019. 
 
Although Semenya’s case has paved the way for questioning existing gender norms in 
sport, a new stable norm has yet to emerge from her case.  Montanola (2016) has defined Caster 
Semenya’s case as an “aporia” due to the inherent tensions and apparent un-resolvability of a 
10-year old case already with no clear end in sight.7 Its apparent un-resolvability has led to the 
unsatisfactory – for many, including myself – solution of requiring the medicalisation of 
otherwise physiologically healthy, although deviant from sexual binary norms, bodies. This in 
turn has led to the World Medical Association (WMA) to come forward with a strong statement 
calling on physicians not to comply with the regulations on grounds that “they are not based 
on medical need” and hence fall outside the recognised and widely accepted scope of medicine 
which is to benefit the patients.8 As I aim to show in this paper, though,  the IAAF’s 
pharmacological solution to the tension between fairness and inclusivity is not, however, the 
only possible solution to the, nor need be. 
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2. Background to the case: The Dutee Chand Interim Arbitral Award 
 
To understand the current challenge, one has to take a step back and review the critical 
moment in July 2015 when CAS released an Interim Award in the Chand v. AFI and IAAF 
case.9 Dutee Chand, Indian sprinter, was targeted by the IAAF hyperandrogenism regulations 
in 2014, and was required to take androgen suppressive therapy to be eligible to compete in the 
female category. Chand refused to comply and appealed to CAS.10 Hearings were held at the 
CAS headquarters in Lausanne in March 2015. On July 24th, CAS ruled that the regulations 
were being suspended for “absence of sufficient evidence about the degree of advantage that 
androgen-sensitive hyperandrogenic females enjoy over non-hyperandrogenic females 
(paragraph 522, Interim Award CAS). 9 IAAF was given two years (later, extended by three 
months) to produce additional evidence about the correlation between endogenous testosterone 
and performance advantage. While the suspension of the regulations was cause for immediate 
relief for Chand and other hyperandrogenic athletes – including Semenya – who were able to 
resume competition, a careful reading of the Interim Award would have shown how it was 
leaving space open for additional controversy. The question of what evidence was expected to 
be able to achieve resolution of the case was already there, in the Chand Interim Award,. 
Indeed, IAAF was quick to acknowledge that CAS had accepted the logic of their submission 
that a correlation between testosterone and performance advantage would be able to settle the 
dispute: “The IAAF is also happy to note the CAS Panel’s ruling that there is a sound scientific 
basis to the Regulations, in that endogenous testosterone is the best indicator of performance 
differences between male and female athletes, and its acceptance that hyperandrogenic female 
athletes may have a competitive advantage over athletes with testosterone levels in the normal 
female range”.11 However, as I have argued before, 12,13 a judicial framing of the Chand case 
as a matter of demonstrating only a correlation between testosterone and athletic performance 
in female athletes falls short of establishing the unfairness of such advantage, and hence the 
necessity of regulations requiring athletes to lower their endogenous levels of testosterone. 
 
 
3. The Semenya and Athletics South Africa appeal against IAAF 2018 Regulations 
on Eligibility for Female Classification 
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Fast forward two years to July 2017, when a study published in the British Journal of 
Sports Medicine authored by Stephane Bermon and Pierre-Ives Garnier concluded that 
hyperandrogenic female athletes enjoy a degree of advantage of 1.8–2.8% over their fellow 
athletes in a specific set of track and field events.14 This study, commissioned and funded by 
IAAF and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), was submitted to CAS in response to the 
Chand 2015 Interim Arbitral Award. On April 26th, 2018, new IAAF Regulations Governing 
the Eligibility of Female Classification,15 which built directly on the Bermon and Garnier 
study, were released to come into force November 1st, 2018. The regulations  required female 
athletes with differences of sex differentiation (DSDs) to take androgen suppressive therapy to 
lower their testosterone levels to below 5 nmol/L to be eligible to compete in the female 
category for running events between the 400 m and the mile (400 m; 400 m hurdles; 800 m; 
1,500 m and the mile).  
There are several issues with the Bermon and Garnier study providing evidence for the 
regulation. First, several independent studies,16-18 have pointed to problems in their statistical 
analysis, and to a high likelihood of false positives. There is also an obvious conflict of interest 
as the main author Stephane Bermon is Director of the IAAF Science and Health Department. 
As it has been pointed out by Roger Pielke in his expert testimony to CAS: “No other regulatory 
context exists where the evidence base for regulation is provided primarily by the regulatory 
body itself” (CAS Award, page 29).19 There are also concerns of ethical misconduct in the way 
informed consent was obtained: Bermon and Garnier’s analysis relies on blood samples 
provided by athletes during doping control tests at the 2011 and 2013 IAAF World 
Championships. The athletes who had provided their blood samples had not consented to the 
use of their samples for anything beyond doping testing. Notwithstanding these issues, which 
were at the centre of ASA’s legal challenge, CAS decided to admit the evidence in court. This 
paper is not the venue to explore further these points, but I think it is quite straightforward that 
IAAF’s use of those blood samples for research into the effects of testosterone levels on female 
athletic performance was unethical. Consent needs to be specific to the purpose of the research 
unless it is very clearly stated that athletes gave blanket consent for research purposes on their 
blood samples. There should be higher standards for admissibility of evidence in CAS. 
Two additional points are worth noting briefly before proceeding further: the lack of 
consensus guidelines on how to safely use medications to lower testosterone levels when used 
off-label (as noted by the expert testimony Professor Marc Blockman, pp 57-58 of CASArbitral 
Award19), the side effects of the medications, the difficulties of maintaining the testosterone 
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levels below the levels requested by IAAF due to natural fluctuations, and strict liability of the 
regulations on the athlete, may very well render impossible the implementation itself of the 
regulations. These points were recognised by CAS in their Arbitral Award, where they noted 
“difficulties of implementation of the DSD regulations”19 and “serious concerns about the 
future practical application of the DSD Regulations”. 20  
 
 
4. Empirical and normative concerns in the Semenya’s case 
 
The press release announcing the decision to dismiss Semenya’s and ASA’s appeal 
released on May 1st, 2019 noted that the CAS Panel was “restrained in its task, due to the strict 
framework of the arbitration, to solely determine whether the DSD Regulations were invalid 
or not”.20 The Executive summary of the Decision further explain that the Panel’s function was 
“a purely judicial one” and that it was “neither necessary nor appropriate for the Panel to step 
into the shoes of the IAAF by deciding how it would have approached issues had it been 
charged with making policies or enacting rules itself”.4 The limits of the judicial role and the 
‘strict framework of the arbitration’ were, as noted, set with reference to Chand’s case. On page 
76-77 of the CAS Arbitral Award, 19 IAAF writes that sports benefit from “a significant margin 
of appreciation in determining what is necessary and proportionate to achieve their legitimate 
objectives”. They continue:  
 
“Accordingly, the IAAF must decide what is necessary and proportionate to achieve its 
aims on the basis of an honest and good faith that has a reasonable basis. As long as 
that test is met, it is irrelevant that others may disagree with that view, or may cite other 
contrary scientific evidence. Rather, in order to succeed in their challenge, the 
Claimants must establish that a reasonable person acting in good faith could not hold 
the view that the DSD regulations are necessary and appropriate to achieve the IAAF’s 
legitimate objectives”.  
 
I find this argument simply appalling. It should not be the case that one of the two 
parties determine on whom the burden of proof should fall, and what this burden of proof 
should amount to, or what kind of standards of scientific evidence can be admitted in court. It 
should be up to the Arbitrator to determine that. I find the fact that CAS was bound (or, felt 
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bound) to a “strict framework for the arbitration” which limited its role to a mere judicial one, 
and left IAAF a wide margin of discretion in determining that the burden of proof fell on the 
Claimants to disprove the validity of the regulations, and also a wide margin of action to 
determine the admissibility of evidence in the scientific court below the scientifically accepted 
standards in other contexts, to be a significant problem for sports and international law.  
 In the Arbitral Decision, CAS also explicitly referenced the Chand Interim Award as a 
starting point for the discussion of Semenya’s case, although it also explicitly stated that 
Semenya’s case was not an appeal to the Chand case (comma 470-1, p. 122 of the Arbitral 
Award 19). In comma 474 of the CAS Award the judges sum up the “factual and scientific 
questions” that the panel dealt with, and refer to the ‘magnitude’ of the advantage of 
testosterone as being a key question for judgment of fairness (page 123,19).  This is due, as I 
explained in the previous section, to the judicial resolution in the 2015 Chand Interim Arbitral 
Award. Although empirical data can help us answer the question of the extent to which the 
advantage conferred by testosterone is quantitatively different from the advantage given by 
other genetic and biological variations, they fall short of establish the fairness or unfairness of 
the advantage. An empirical analysis of the magnitude of the advantage need only be the first, 
necessary although not sufficient, step in the adjudication of the case.  
What type of evidence should CAS instead have been requesting, since the Dutee 
Chand case, and in the Semenya and ASA vs IAAF case? I contend that in order to achieve 
resolution of the case, the following empirical and normative questions need to be addressed: 
 
1. In what ways is testosterone dissimilar from other genetic variations that confer a 
property advantage? 
2. How do we treat alike cases? 
 
Let me tackle both questions in turn. 
 
4.1 In what ways is testosterone dissimilar from other genetic variations that confer a property 
advantage? 
 
In the philosophy of sport literature, a ‘property advantage’ is defined as “A has an 
advantage over B in property X if A has a more favourable amount of this property X than B 
does”, where properties are “constituent parts of competitors and competition environment”.21 
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Performance advantage in a given competition is a function of many different property 
advantages. In what follows I refer to genetic variations that confer a property advantage as 
‘property advantages’ for short, although there are many non-genetic factors that contribute 
overall to performance advantage, but they are not relevant for this discussion. 
 
There are three key ways in which testosterone can be considered different from other 
property advantages, as discussed in the literature: 
 
4.1a) By degree of magnitude; i.e. the advantage conferred by testosterone on 
performance advantage is greater than the advantage conferred by other biological or genetic 
variations; 
4.1b) By being an “all-purpose benefit” versus a “sport-specific benefit; i.e. the 
advantage conferred by testosterone results in a performance benefit in all sports, contrary to 
other advantages which are sport-specific.22  
4.1c) By virtue of playing the key role in relation to the current binary categorization 
in sport, i.e. testosterone is different from other biological and genetic variations because the 
current binary categorization is sport is predicated on the assumption that testosterone can 
function as the watershed between the male and female category. 
 
I am not going to elaborate here on each point (for a longer discussion see23), however 
I would like to note that both a) and b) are open for empirical scrutiny, while c) is a result of a 
historical convention leading to categorising sport in binary male and female categories. At the 
moment, we have only limited empirical data on which we can draw comparisons between the 
different genetic variations and relative performance advantages. What we do know is that 
there are many genetic variations that confer a ‘property advantage’ and are found more 
frequently in elite athletes than in the general populations. These allelic variations span from 
variations in oxygen carrying capacity of red blood cells, due to mutations in the erythropoietin 
receptor gene (EPOR); to enzymes involved in the conversion of angiotensin (ACE) associated 
with increased endurance performance in athletic cohorts; to allelic variations in the alfa-
actinin gene (ACTN3) determining the distribution of muscular fibre types (slow, or fast).24 
Some of these variations lie at the border between the physiological and the pathological, 
depending on the context: while they can be advantageous on the field of play, they can be 
disadvantageous in other aspects of life. A living example was Finnish skier Eero Mäntyranta, 
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who rose to athletic fame in cross-country skiing during the 1960s. Mäntyranta was affected 
by a genetic condition known as familial primary polycythaemia caused by mutations in the 
erythropoietin receptor gene (EPOR), which leads to a 30-50% increased production of red 
blood cells. 25 This in turn led to an increase of his oxygen carrying capacity and gave him a 
formidable advantage in long-distance competitions (he had a haematocrit level of 60-65). 
Alun Williams, sport geneticist at the University of Manchester and expert witness at CAS on 
behalf of Semenya, testified that “there is no clear qualitative distinction between the types of 
genetic variations that cause DSDs and [others]” and added that “There is no scientific basis 
for treating a DSD mutation as an unfair performance advantage while treating the EPOR 
mutation as an acceptable performance advantage” (page 34 CAS Award, 19). In his testimony, 
Williams proceeded to compare the performance advantage derived by DSDs mutations and 
the phenotypic effects of the ACTN-3 allele, which is also considered an acceptable 
performance advantage in sprinting and power events (Williams testified that athletes who 
possess the ACTN-3 allele are likely to “sweep the podium” in power/sprinting events (page 
34 CAS Award,19)). More research into the relative performance advantage conferred by 
testosterone compared to other property advantages in specific events in track and field (the 
context of the current case) or in other sports is required to answer this first question. 
Point 4.1b) is related to 4.1a): Is there a sound basis to single out specific sports, or 
sport-specific events, from others, because of the role that testosterone plays in providing 
athletes with a performance advantage? There is disagreement in the scientific community on 
whether testosterone is an all-purpose benefit or a sports-specific benefit. According to some, 
testosterone confers a benefit on performance in all sports, contrary to other advantages which 
are sport-specific and allow athletes to self-select into a sport. If this were the case, it would 
constitute a reason to treat testosterone differently from other property advantages. However, 
others disagree. When reading the full Arbitral Award, one has the clear impression (confirmed 
by the statement of the Executive summary in the panel that the issues were not “easy to 
decide”, and that the decision was reached by a majority”) that while certain expert testimonies 
believe that testosterone is not different from other property advantages, others believe that it 
is. In other words, that there is a reasonable disagreement among experts which needs to be 
settled by further empirical evidence.1. 
 
1 I am aware that at least two teams currently working in the UK, one at the University of Loughborough and 
one at Sussex University, are actively working on finding the answers to the first two questions 
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The third point 4.1.c) is not open for empirical scrutiny, but is a point that has been 
made by IAAF and accepted by CAS. In their testimony in front of CAS, IAAF argues that 
testosterone is different from other property advantages because there are no categories based 
on other property advantages. As noted at Comma 22 of the Executive Award, IAAF submits 
that “all but one of the many different factors that contribute to sport performance are equally 
available to men and women”, except testosterone. This point, I note, was accepted by the 
majority only of the CAS Panel, as noted at the same Comma of the Executive Award. While 
the discussion about the creation of different categories in track and field has been foreclosed 
by IAAF and CAS Award at the very beginning of their Arbitration, where they state that the 
decision is “constrained by the accepted, necessary, binary division of athletics into male and 
female events”,4 that should not, I argue, be taken as a given, or immutable element of sport. I 
elaborate on this point below. 
To sum up, what I aimed to do in this section was to outline two keys ways in which 
testosterone could considered similar or dissimilar from other property advantages and which 
are open for empirical scrutiny, and point to a third way in which testosterone has been said to 
differ from other property advantages which is based on a historical convention i.e. the binary 
division in male and female categories in track & field, which need not be taken for granted. 
Now on to the second type of normative concerns. 
  
4.2 How to treat alike cases? 
 
Fairness demands that alike cases are treated alike.26 Once empirical data have established 
whether testosterone and other property advantages can be considered alike cases, or not, we 
can proceed to establish how to treat them according to normative judgments of fairness. It 
does not follow from the fact that empirical data might have established whether testosterone 
and other property advantages are alike - or not - that we should prescribe pharmacological 
treatment to lower testosterone levels, as IAAF contends.  
 
Let us imagine that in our parallel CAS Hearing, both parties were to submit evidence in 
response to the first and second empirical questions. Let us also suppose that the 3rd point of 
discussion (the binary categorisation) were not closed off from the start. On the basis of the 
submitted evidence, the CAS panel could come to two different conclusions: 
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1. Testosterone is different in at least one of the  above respects  from other property 
advantages 
2. Testosterone is not different in any of the above respects from other property advantages  
 
Let us analyse both scenarios in turn. 
 
4.2.1 Testosterone is different in at least one of the above respects from other property 
advantages 
 
In the first scenario, normative considerations of fairness would require testosterone to 
be treated differently from other property advantages. However, the pharmacological solution 
would only be one of the possible scenarios which would meet the demands of fairness, as I 
outline below. There could be at least two other options open to CAS when adjudicating the 
case which would do so. CAS could: 
 
 4.2.1a) Maintain the binary division in male/female categories and require athletes to 
pharmacologically lower their levels of testosterone; 
4.2.1b) Abandon the binary division in male/female categories and create separate 
categories based on the level of testosterone or more complex algorithms;  
4.2.1c) Abandon the binary division in male/female categories and create categories 
based on external modifications to redress biological advantages; 
 
Having agreed on the necessity and unchallengeability of the division into male and 
female category, the first solution is the preferred by IAAF and CAS. However, this necessity 
is neither apparent nor undisputable as I among others have argued – it is a consequence of 
historical tradition and conventions in sport. As a matter of fact, solution 4.2.1b), while 
presenting challenges of feasibility and applicability, is a theoretically possible solution which 
has already been explored by many including Foddy and Savulescu,27 Cooky and Dworkin,28 
Sudai,29 Knox et al, 30 and Bianchi,31 among others. Some of these scholars have gone to great 
lengths to suggest a feasible and practical application beyond a mere speculative thought 
experiment. Recently Stephane Bermon, when speaking in a personal capacity to the Guardian, 
was reported saying that he has the “feeling some day it will happen, and probably in five or 
10 years”.32 Hence it does not seem to be such an outlandish possibility engaged with only by 
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philosophers of sport, but worth exploring also by policy makers, sports lawyers and legislators 
to work out the details on how it might work in practice. 
Solution 4.2.1c) would amount to redressing biological advantages with external, non- 
pharmacological interventions aimed at modifying the environment and not the athletes’ 
bodies. It takes its cues from sports where external modifications are made to redress 
advantages. As noted in33 (p. 143), in horse racing weights are added. One could consider 
weighted clothing or modifying the track. Many such external modifications could be 
considered, which might be more respectful of the athletes’ biology than pharmacological 
interventions. However, this solution seems less feasible in practice than solution 1b) and it 
has been less explored in the literature. 
 
4.2.2 Testosterone is not different in any of the respects above from other property 
advantages  
 
What if CAS were to conclude, on the basis of the submitted evidence to the first two 
empirical questions, that testosterone is not different from other property advantages in any of 
the above respects? Would that easily settle the matter in favour of Semenya and Chand? One 
might think so, but upon reflection it would become evident that the solution about how to treat 
alike cases would not follow from empirical data only. As a matter of fact, there could still be 
at least three other options open for how to resolve the case, which would be in line with the 
requirements of fairness, but which would differ in other considerations. CAS, as the arbitrator 
could decide to: 
 
4.2.2a) Maintain the binary division and let athletes compete with the bodies they are 
born with (a version of the natural/genetic lottery argument); 
 
4.2. 2b) Abandon the binary division and consistently redress all genetic inequalities in 
favour of a “level playing field” understanding of fairness applied to each type of inequality 
for which we would have scientific evidence. This could be achieved in three ways: 
  2b.I) lowering levels of hormones/proteins above a certain threshold; 
2b.II) creating separate categories based on the level of biological variations; 
2b.III) creating categories based on external modifications not aimed at 
intervening on the athletes’ bodies. 
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The careful reader will already have noted how these last three scenarios are iterations of the 
scenarios we encountered in 4.2.1. As a matter of fact, and as noted again by expert witness 
Alun Williams in his testimony, the only difference between testosterone and other biological 
or genetic variations is that, presently, “It is not known which elite athletes have which 
advantageous genetic variations” (CAS Award May 1st, p. 34). This article is not the venue to 
explore in detail each option and its feasibility.  However, I would like to note that once we 
begin (as we have started to do already) to know more about the genetic basis of sports 
performance of individual athletes, we open up a can of worms in terms of normative 
judgments of fairness of how to treat alike cases2. This means that when opening the floodgates 
for more research into the genetic basis of sport performance, different solutions (including 
some surprising ones!) about how to regulate competition on grounds of fairness might arise. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
My goal in this paper has been to outline the shortcomings in how the Semenya and 
ASA vs IAAF case and previously the Dutee Chand vs AFI and IAAF have been judicially 
framed.  I have argued that the grounds on which the CAS 2015 Interim Arbitral Award was 
established were too narrow as they were based in empirical concerns only, and set up the 
current case for a further aporia (as Montanola would say), as more evidence of the type 
requested by CAS cannot lead to a normative resolution of the case. The key point of this paper 
is that the question of what to do with that evidence is a normative question, which necessarily 
involves an engagement with empirical data to ascertain in what ways, if any, testosterone is 
dissimilar from other property advantages. Once empirical data have led us to establish whether 
we are dealing with ‘alike cases’, or not, the normative question of how to treat alike cases on 
the basis of fairness ensues. It does not follow from the establishment that testosterone confers 
more of an advantage than other variations, that we need to suppress it. Other scenarios are 
possible, which would meet the requirement of fairness to treat alike cases alike. These would 
require challenging the binary division into male/female categories. As noted above, these are 
theoretically appealing scenarios with potential for consideration not only by philosophers but 
also by policy makers and legislators. 
Importantly, CAS, as the supreme arbitrator in legal disputes in international sports law, 
should not be restrained in how it can adjudicate the case to a ‘purely judicial role’ limiting it 
 
2 I am grateful to Jim Parry and the students of the MAiSI Erasmus Programme for this suggestion. 
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to decide whether regulations are invalid or not, but should instead retain the discretion to 
decide whether such policies or rules should be enacted in the first place: Are they the best 
possible solution to respond to the tensions intrinsic in sport and respond to demands of fairness 
and inclusivity?  
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